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Abstract  
 
Researchers studying human behavioral genetics have made significant scientific progress in 
enhancing our understanding of the relative contributions of genetics and the environment in 
observed variations in human behavior.  Quickly outpacing the advances in the science are its 
applications in the criminal justice system.  Already, human behavioral genetics research has 
been introduced in the U.S. criminal justice system, and its use will only become more 
prevalent.  This essay discusses the recent historical use of behavioral genetics in criminal 
cases, recent advances in two gene variants of particular interest in the criminal law, MAOA 
and SLC6A4, the recent expert testimony on behalf of criminal defendants with respect to 
these two gene variants, and the future direction of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal 
cases.   
 
Use of Human Behavioural Genetics in Criminal Cases  
 
With increasing frequency, practitioners in the U.S. criminal justice system have introduced 
expert testimony regarding the biological predispositions of criminal defendants, thus far with 
limited success.  With the scientific research still in its infancy, criminal defendants have 
encountered significant hurdles when introducing expert testimony into U.S. criminal 
courtrooms regarding behavioural genetics.  These defendants have primarily failed in their 
attempts because of the inadequacy of the science, the theoretical incompatibility of the 
evidence with the claim advanced, or because of procedural issues in U.S. criminal law barring 
the introduction of such evidence.  
 
In several cases, criminal defendants have introduced biological predisposition testimony in an 
attempt to negate the presumption they acted voluntarily in the commission of the crime.  The 
majority of defendants to advance such claims have done so in the context of drug or alcohol 
addiction.
1
 In these cases, the defendant claims to have acted involuntarily as a consequence of 
his drug or alcohol addiction, for which he had a genetic predisposition.
2 
This claim has 
largely failed primarily because it is at odds with the firmly rooted position in the U.S. 
criminal law that voluntary intoxication cannot serve to excuse criminal conduct.  In contexts 
other than addiction, however, American courts have demonstrated some willingness to 
entertain the claim that a defendant’s biological predisposition negates the voluntary act 
prerequisite for criminal liability.  In the 2004 case of Herman Henry ‘Bud’ Von Dohlen, for 
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found persuasive the argument that the 
defendant’s mental disease, severe depression arising from a genetic predisposition, rendered 
the homicide a product of disease, disassociated from the will, rather than a voluntary criminal 
act by the defendant.
3 
Von Dohlen was convicted and sentenced to death for the armed robbery 
and murder of a dry-cleaning shop employee he fatally shot in the back of the head.
4
  In 
support of his claim for post-conviction relief, a psychologist testified that as a result of ‘his 
altered mental state ‘[the murder] was not a volitional thing but out of his conscious awareness 
or control.’’
5
 On appeal, the court reversed the earlier court’s denial of post-conviction relief, 
finding instead that the psychological testimony created a ‘reasonable probability the outcome 
of the trial might have been different had the jury heard the available information about [the 
defendant’s] mental condition.’
6  
 
Defendants have advanced related arguments to rebut the mental state (mens rea) element of 
the crime, although, based on a review of appellate records in U.S. cases, only a few 
defendants have offered evidence of a behavioural predisposition for this purpose. In one of 
the few recorded instances of such a claim in the U.S., State v. Davis,
7
 the 
defendant argued that his mental condition, to which he was genetically predisposed, 
prevented him from forming the requisite intent to commit first-degree murder, reckless 
endangerment, or possession of a weapon on school property.
8
 In support of this defence, he 
presented psychiatric testimony that he had a ‘genetic predisposition’ for depression and 
mental illness, shown by the history of severe depression in his family.
9 
The jury rejected his 
claim,
10
 and the court affirmed on appeal, noting that the objective manifestations of Davis’s 
behaviour prior to and during the commission of the alleged crime properly informed the 
jury’s determination of his mental state.
11 
Although genetic predisposition testimony has 
likewise been introduced to establish the defendant acted in accordance with a mental disease 
or defect in support of an insanity defence, courts generally conclude the defendant could still 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and conform to the law.
12
  Nonetheless, when such 
testimony is introduced to bolster expert diagnosis of a mental condition, defendants have had 
more success.
13  
 
 
The majority of criminal defendants to have introduced expert testimony regarding their 
behavioural predisposition in U.S. criminal cases have done so in an attempt to mitigate their 
sentence, rather than to excuse or justify criminal conduct.
14 
When used as mitigating 
evidence, defendants argue that their genetic predispositions make them less culpable 
offenders because their behaviour arose not as a result of ‘bad character’ but from ‘bad genes.’ 
Although such evidence could be used along with other mitigating circumstances, several 
criminal defendants have relied on behavioural genetics as the principal theory of mitigation 
during sentencing.
 15
 For example, in Crook v. State,
16
 the defendant argued that his organic 
brain damage predisposed him to fits of violence.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida 
vacated the defendant’s death sentence finding that the defendant’s brain damage should 
clearly have been weighed to determine the appropriateness of a death sentence.  As the 
science develops, particularly in elucidating the relationship between specific genetic factors 
and behavioural outcomes, mitigation theories like this one will likely become more prevalent 
in U.S. criminal cases.  To date, however, only a few experts have managed to link the 
defendant’s general behavioural predisposition and his specific criminal act in question;
17
 
establishing the link between a general genetic predisposition and the ultimate criminal act 
will be essential for this evidence to have significant future relevance.  
 
Current Developments in Human Behavioral Genetics Research and Violence:  MAOA 
and SLC6A4  
 
The above cases illustrate the use of expert testimony in U.S. criminal cases regarding a 
defendant’s general genetic predispositions with respect to his criminal conduct.  It is possible 
that these earlier attempts to introduce behavioural genetics in the criminal law may have been 
too simplistic.  Earlier claims in U.S. criminal cases rooted in behavioural genetics sought to 
establish that a single chromosomal abnormality (XXY), or a mutation at single gene (MAOA 
knockout) could explain, or even excuse, violent criminal behaviour.  Recent scientific 
research, however, has illuminated a more compelling understanding of the interplay between 
specific gene variants, environmental stressors, and violence.  These new scientific discoveries 
may provide a more meaningful understanding of behavioural differences between individuals, 
and have a greater potential impact on criminal proceedings.   
  
In 2002, a research team based in New Zealand published a seminal paper that proposed a 
mechanism through which a person’s genetic makeup and childhood experience might 
combine through a gene-environment interaction (G x E) to increase an individual’s risk of 
becoming violent or expressing antisocial tendencies as an adult.
18
  Essentially, this research 
team concluded that individuals with a particular allele of the MAOA gene, together with a 
history of serious childhood maltreatment were more likely to manifest violent and antisocial 
behaviour as adolescents and adults.
19
 Previous research made evident that although many 
abused children become violent adults, most do not.  The researchers postulated that a child’s 
genetic makeup might modify his susceptibility to maltreatment.  Specifically, the researchers 
tested whether a functional polymorphism in the promoter region of the MAOA gene would 
characterize genetic susceptibility to maltreatment.  They selected the MAOA gene for study, 
in part, because an earlier study had identified a mutation of the MAOA gene in a Dutch family 
with a history of violence in the males.
20 
This mutation, which eliminated MAOA enzymatic 
activity, was linked to male antisocial behaviour.  While the MAOA mutation in the Dutch 
family has since been demonstrated to occur only rarely, the polymorphism of the promoter 
region of the MAOA gene causes common variants in gene expression.  
 
The MAOA gene – located on the X-chromosome – encodes the MAOA enzyme, which 
metabolizes neurotransmitters such as serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine.  The 
promoter region of the MAOA gene has either four repeats (causing high activity of the 
MAOA enzyme) or three repeats (causing low activity of the enzyme).  In the DMHDS study 
population, 63% had four repeats and 37% had three repeats. The research team determined 
the gene variant possessed by each study participant, as well as the incidence of childhood 
abuse for each participant.  They ascertained that endowment with the 3-repeat allele of the 
MAOA gene together with childhood maltreatment was significantly correlated with violent 
antisocial behaviour in adolescents and adults.  Consequently, they concluded that ‘[f]or adult 
violent conviction, maltreated males with the low-MAO-A activity genotype were more likely 
than nonmaltreated males with this genotype to be convicted of a violent crime by a significant 
odds ration of 9.8.’
21 
These study findings were replicated by Foley et al. (2004),
22
 Huang et 
al. (2004),
23
 Jaffee et al. (2005),
24
 and Nilsson et al. (2005).
25 
Although each of these later 
studies used varying definitions of child maltreatment, violent behaviour, and genetic risk, 
they all concluded that there was a gene x environment interaction consistent with the research 
reported by Caspi et al.(2002).  
 
A year after publication of their paper on MAOA and child maltreatment, the research team of 
Caspi et al. (2003) published a second example of a gene x environmental interaction.
26
  In the 
second paper, they reported a functional polymorphism in the promoter region of the serotonin 
transporter gene.  The official term for the serotonin transporter gene is SLC6A4, although it is 
sometimes referred to as SERT and 5-HTT. The SLC64A gene – located on chromosome 17 – 
encodes a protein that facilitates activity of the serotonin transporter system.  The serotonin 
transporter facilitates re-uptake of serotonin from the synapse back into the neuron.  The 
promoter region of the SLC64A gene can have either a ‘long allele’ or a ‘short allele.’ The 
long allele is correlated with high activity of the serotonin transporter system, while the short 
allele is correlated with low activity.
27  
 
The researchers sought to understand the genetic and environmental interaction between the 
SLC64A gene variants and stressful life events.  Specifically, they were interested in 
examining why some individuals become depressed and suicidal when faced with stressful life 
events, while other subjects appear to be more resilient.  They hypothesized that the long allele 
of the SLC64A gene served as functional protection for carriers against the effects of stressful 
life events.  Caspi and his colleagues once again reported a sophisticated gene and 
environmental interaction highly correlated with the differences in coping with stressful life 
events.  They concluded that ‘[i]ndividuals with one or two copies of the short allele … 
exhibited more depressive symptoms, diagnosable depression, and suicidality in relation to 
stressful life events than individuals homozygous for the long allele.’
28  
 
This research may have significant potential application for criminal law.  In much the same 
way that genetic predisposition evidence has previously been presented, these more specific 
interactions provide a more detailed understanding of differences in human behaviour and 
potentially more compelling testimony for consideration by juries. For example, a defendant 
charged with a violent crime may claim his behaviour could in part be attributed to the 
interaction of his genes (e.g., the 3-repeat MAOA gene causing low activity of the MAOA 
enzyme) and his life experiences (severe child abuse). On the other hand, a prosecutor may 
claim that the defendant’s genetic makeup simply means he is a ‘born killer’ and should surely 
be incarcerated.    
 
Legal Precedents regarding MAOA and SLC6A4  
 
To date, testimony regarding these research findings in U.S. criminal cases has been quite 
limited.  In May 2004, the faculty of Vanderbilt Forensic Psychiatry (a component of the 
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine Department of Psychiatry in Nashville, Tennessee) 
started to include genetic testing as part of their comprehensive pre-trial forensic psychiatric 
evaluation of defendants charged with homicide.  As of February of 2006, this team has 
conducted MAOA and SLC64A genotyping on nine men and one woman charged with first-
degree murder.  Since August 2005, this team has testified regarding MAOA and/or SLC64A 
genotyping of four defendants in U.S. criminal cases.  The details of this testimony will be 
reported in a future publication, once the legal outcome of these cases has been resolved.  
 
In earlier unrelated cases, one criminal defendant sought MAOA testing, while several other 
defendants have introduced claims based on serotonin levels.  The 1994 criminal case of 
Stephen A. Mobley is the sole reported case in the U.S. referencing MAOA genotyping prior to 
the Caspi et. al. studies of 2002 and 2003.29 
 
At trial, Mobley, who was convicted of murder 
and other related offences, filed a motion seeking funds to hire expert witnesses to assess his 
potential deficiency in MAOA enzymatic activity, based on the then-recent studies suggesting 
‘a possible genetic basis for violent and impulsive behaviour in certain individuals,’ and his 
family history of violence.  The trial court denied Mobley’s motion, finding that the link 
between MAOA and violence lacked scientific verifiability sufficient for either the guilt or 
sentencing phases of his capital trial.  
 
SLC6A4 genotyping has not been referenced in any published U.S. case as evidence presented 
during trial. Instead, expert testimony regarding a defendant’s serotonin levels, a more tenuous 
claim, has been introduced in several U.S. criminal cases, usually to establish a link between a 
defendant’s low serotonin levels and impulse control or intermittent explosive disorder.
30 
The 
defendants in these cases claim to suffer from an inability to form the requisite intent for the 
alleged crime, or claim to have diminished culpability for purposes of sentencing.  The 
defendants in these cases have enjoyed some success, such as a reduction from first to second 
degree murder, or potential mitigating effect during sentencing.  However, because the link 
between serotonin levels and violence or impulse control is poorly understood, these claims 
have only had limited success when challenged by other expert testimony.    
 
In short, we stand on the cusp of the introduction of this new behavioural research into 
criminal trials.  Expert testimony regarding the research on MAOA and SLC6A4, together with 
a presentation of the relevant environmental factors could play a significant role in criminal 
cases going forward.  
 
Future Directions  
 
We are not proposing that the science of behavioural genetics will favour either the defence or 
the prosecution in criminal trials. We are simply predicting that research in this area will 
flourish and will identify more interactions among specific genes and specific life experiences, 
which promote specific behavioural outcomes.  As the data amasses, the conclusions regarding 
the biological contribution to behaviour will become more precise, and the degree of scientific 
probability will become more robust.  
 
Criminal defence attorneys, for example, may seek to present testimony regarding behavioural 
genetics in several circumstances:  
 
 As mitigating evidence during capital sentencing hearings;   
 To bolster the argument that a defendant may have been unable to subjectively form 
the mental state required for a particular crime, particularly with respect to 
premeditation for first degree murder;  
 As evidence to inform the defendant’s competence to assist in his defence or to waive 
Miranda rights;   
 In the juvenile justice system to demonstrate that the juvenile’s behaviour was partly 
determined by factors that were beyond his control (such as his genes and his history of 
child abuse) and that may be treatable, to support retaining the case in juvenile court 
rather than moving to criminal court.  
 
The prosecution may also make use of behavioural genetics evidence.  For example, the 
prosecution could rely on behavioural genetics evidence to suggest that a criminal defendant 
poses a continuing threat to society or to support a finding of future dangerousness. 
Prosecutors could also use such evidence to malign the jury against the criminal defendant.   
 
This likelihood has already been realized in one case,
31
 where the prosecutor referred to the 
defendant’s family history of crime during his closing statement to the jury as demonstrating 
that the defendant came from a ‘family of crime.’
32 
Although the court acknowledged that in 
some contexts, ‘this statement might be inappropriate, as it might indicate (for instance) a 
genetic predisposition to crime,’ in the case at hand the court was unconcerned because it 
considered the statement merely hyperbolic, not grossly denigrating.
33  
 
Consequently, behavioural genetics evidence may be a double-edged sword for criminal 
defendants.  Indeed, recent opinions in U.S. cases demonstrate that the introduction of 
behavioural genetics testimony by defendants could be adversely interpreted. The opinion 
issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Landrigan v. Stewart
34
 
provides a stark example of this phenomenon.  Jeffrey Landrigan filed a petition for federal 
habeas corpus relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his 
capital case because his attorneys, following the defendant’s explicit instruction, failed to 
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of Landrigan’s trial.
35
 Four years after 
sentencing, however, Landrigan argued that notwithstanding his instructions at trial, he would 
have cooperated had his attorneys attempted to offer mitigating evidence demonstrating that 
his ‘biological background made him what he is.’
36 
The Ninth Circuit found such testimony 
unmoving, holding instead that ‘although Landrigan’s new evidence can be called mitigating 
in some slight sense, it would also have shown the court that it could anticipate that he would 
continue to be violent.’
37 
At this stage of scientific progress regarding behavioural genetics, 
and the limited treatment options that may be available, defence lawyers should carefully 
consider whether evidence of an alleged genetic defect would help or hurt the defendant.    
 
We predict that in the future, genetic testing will play an increasingly central role in criminal 
trials.  For example, new research designs make likely that specific groups of genes will be 
identified that contribute to the development of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  Criminal 
defendant will likely seek testing for these gene variants to support a claim of legal insanity.  
Prosecutors may likewise use a defendant’s lack of these gene variants to support the 
contention that the defendant is malingering a psychiatric disorder and therefore not  legally 
insane.  Alternately, genetic testing may play an increased role in the evaluation and 
disposition of sexual offenders.  For instance, specific gene-environment interactions may be 
correlated with a predisposition toward sexual disorders such as paedophilia.  Future research 
could be used to support the contention that individuals with these factors are more likely to be 
recidivists, while individuals without these factors be more likely to be rehabilitated with 
treatment.  The defendant’s genetic makeup could thus become a central issue with respect to 
parole or indefinite commitment decisions.  
 
The future promises a deluge of gene-environment research on human behaviour, and such 
evidence has and will continue to be introduced in the criminal court room.  Paul  
S. Appelbaum, recently concluded that, ‘[r]ecent research findings … suggest that 
behavio[u]ral genetics may be the next frontier for the world of criminal justice, and mental 
health professionals are likely to play a critical role in helping the courts make sense of the 
new date.’
38 
The recent use of such evidence in the criminal courtroom suggests that his 
prediction is beginning to be realized.     
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